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Introduction 
In 2002, mobs belonging to the cadres of the Hindu religious right (the Sangh Parivar)2 and a 
motley collection of followers executed what is best described as a ‘near pogrom’ of the 
Muslim inhabitants of Ahmedabad, where – although almost all the districts of Gujarat were 
affected by communal violence – aggression against Muslims took on particularly savage 
forms. This paper asks what accounts for the failure of civil society in Ahmedabad to raise a 
collective voice of protest against immoderate and deliberate acts of violence, both by state 
officials and its own organisations.  
 
Violence is not a stranger to Ahmedabad. The city is known for the frequency, the scale and 
the intensity of communal riots between Hindus and Muslims, even when the rest of the 
country and the state of Gujarat have not witnessed such violence. The first communal riot 
occurred in 1941, and another took place on the eve of the partition of the country.3 In 1969, 
in the first major communal riot to take place in the post independence period, 1,500 people 
(90 percent of all those killed) belonged to the Muslim community, and property worth 40 
million rupees was destroyed (Shah 1970). While minor riots occurred in 1971, 1972, 1973, 
1977, 1980, 1981 and 1982, the next major riot took place in 1985, followed by further minor 
riots in 1986, 1987 and 1989. Major riots then occurred in 1990, 1993, 1999 and 2000 (see 
                                                 
1 The paper is based on fieldwork carried out in Ahmedabad in 2006 and 2007 by Praveen Priyadarshi, Silky 
Tyagi and Neha Khanna to whom I owe a great debt. I wish to thank James Putzel, Jo Beall and Wendy Foulds 
of the Crisis States Research Centre for their support. We are grateful to the following organisations and 
individuals who helped us in our research. Hirenbhai Gandhi and Wilfred D’Costa (INSAAF), Oxfam, Darshini 
Mahadevia (University), Ghanshyam Shah, (Social Scientist) Ila Ben Pathak (AWAG), Rajendra Joshi 
(SAATH), Gazala (SAMARTH), Kusum Girish Patel (Lawyer),Yasmeen Rehmani (SAATH)-Zakia- (Action 
Aid), Meera and Rafeeq- (C.F.D. and HUM-Hindu United Muslim Sangathan), Achut Yagnik (SETU), 
Purushottam, (Ekta Yuvak Mandal, Berahmpura), Nafeesa (UTHAN), Zayed (Himmat in Vatva), members of 
Pratham (Education for children), Haneef Lakdawala (SANCHETNA), Father Cedric Prakash (Justice for 
Peace), Abida Ben (Sakhi Mahila Mandal in Saraspur), members of Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association or 
Majoor Mahajan, Manohar Shukla (Secretary of ATLA), Prof. B.B. Patel ( Gandhi Labour Institute), Mujib 
Ahmad Awami (Gujarati Sarvajanik Welfare Trust), Sallubhai (Gomatipur), Mr. Rawal (Joint Managing 
Director, Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation), Girish Patel (TLA), Sarahben (AWAG), Hiren Bhai, 
Noorjehan (Action Aid), faculty of IIM, office of ATIRA Ahmedabad Textile Industries Research Association, 
SVIIPA, GLI- Gandhi Labour Institute,  SPISER- Sardar Patel Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
libraries of SETU, ATMA,GCC, Shabnam Hashmi, Apporvananda, Vijay Jani  (ANHAD), Rashidaben,  Local 
activist, Shehnaz and Hozefa, Aman Samudaya- families of Ekta Nagar, Faizal Park and Baghe Aman. The 
mistakes and the flaws in the paper remain mine. 
2 The core of the Sangh Parivar, or the extended family of groups that are related to each other by their 
commitment to the doctrine of Hindu supremacy, is the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS). This is a highly 
motivated, disciplined and ideologically charged formation. The parliamentary wing of the religious right was 
first known as the Jan Sangh and then in 1980 as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Since the mid 1990s, the BJP 
has been in power in the state government. The two other organisations that act as storm troopers for the 
religious right are the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). Other groups that subscribe to the 
doctrine of extreme religious nationalism come and go, but all such organisations find room beneath the 
umbrella of the Sangh Parivar. 
3 Communal riots occur when members of two communities employ violence against each other, resulting in 
deaths, physical harm, destruction of property and devastation of livelihoods. In India, the category of communal 
violence is normally used to refer to violence among religious communities, most notably between Hindus and 
Muslims. 
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Figure 1 and Annex 1). The immediate provocation for these riots ranged from harassment of 
women, India-Pakistan cricket matches, kite-flying incidents, religious festivals and 
processions, and alleged desecration of holy books, to reservations for lower castes in the 
government and in educational institutions. Caste riots have been transformed into communal 
riots in a shockingly short span of time (Spodek 1989). The time scale of the riots has varied 
from one week (1969) to one year (2000). Not only has the role of the police been ineffective, 
but according to reports by government enquiry commissions and citizen tribunals the police 
have actively participated in the infliction of violence upon the minorities. The army has had 
to be called in repeatedly, but often is not allowed to function effectively.    
 
The 2002 case of communal violence is distinctive from earlier occasions in at least three 
respects. Firstly, the employment of violence was completely one-sided. The immediate 
provocation for the violence was what has come to be known as the ‘Godhra incident’. On 27 
February 2002, the Sabarmati Express left Godhra station, but was halted within one 
kilometre, when someone pulled the chain, in front of Signal Falia, a Muslim-dominated 
locality. A mob consisting of Muslims gathered and began to pelt the train with stones, and 
set one of the coaches on fire, burning fifty-eight passengers, including women and children, 
to death. This act appeared to be a response to the extremely offensive language and actions 
of some of the passengers belonging to the cadres of the religious right, who had harassed 
Muslim passengers on the train. At Godhra station these people had attacked a tea vendor and 
attempted to molest a Muslim woman. Although the police arrested 62 Muslims under the 
draconian Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, the Hindu right immediately capitalised upon 
the tragedy to whip up communal passions. Mobs led by members of the Sangh Parivar 
thereon proceeded to administer brutal vigilante justice. Crowds assembled, inflammatory 
pamphlets were circulated and the Gujarati print media intensified crowd rage by publishing 
unverified reports that Hindu women had been raped by Muslim mobs at Godhra. Thus began 
the cycle of barbaric violence in which Muslim neighbourhoods, shops, restaurants and 
business establishments were burnt, women were gang raped and murdered in particularly 
gruesome ways, little children were massacred and hundreds of Muslims were killed. In 
Ahmedabad alone, 700 Muslims lost their lives, and almost 7,000 were rendered homeless. It 
has been estimated that about 2,000 Muslims lost their lives in the entire state. The carefully 
executed and precisely designed pogrom was meticulously planned and orchestrated by the 
Bajrang Dal, the VHP and the RSS. The selective targeting of Muslims, the arson, the rapes 
and the murders were carried out with the kind of exactitude that presumes foreknowledge 
and advance planning. Mobs were armed with lists of Muslim-owned establishments such as 
shops, restaurants and businesses, even if the owners had given a Hindu name to their 
business enterprises.  The report of the civil liberties organisation, the Peoples Union for 
Democratic Rights (2002), pointed out that the chilling monotony of killing, burning, arson, 
raping, maiming and looting was accompanied by shouts of ‘kill, hack and burn’. The scale 
and the intensity of the violence surpassed that of previous years mainly because this time the 
search and destroy operations were not spontaneous (Breman 2004: 288-9).  
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 Figure 1: Communal Violence in Ahmedabad4 
Source: Reports of inquiry commissions, investigations by concerned citizen groups and civil liberty 
organisations, and newspaper reports. 
 
 
The second distinctive feature of the 2002 violence is that politicians belonging to the BJP 
(which was in power in the state government), bureaucrats and the police were actively 
complicit in these acts. Though the role of the holders of state power in this incident is still 
being investigated by the Special Investigation Commission set up by the central government, 
what is clear is that the state government made absolutely no attempt to protect innocent 
citizens. The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, explained away post-Godhra 
violence in terms of the Newtonian law of physics, as a natural reaction to an (incendiary) 
action. In sum, the government refrained from either preventing Hindu mobs from 
implementing their macabre designs, or from protecting Muslim citizens. On the contrary, 
according to all reliable reports the government gave the cadres of its own party and allied 
organisations a free hand when they set about exterminating members of the minority 
community. For instance, when the Congress Member of Parliament, Ehsan Jaffri, requested 
police protection against a huge mob that had gathered outside the building in which he lived, 
his pleas met with no response. He, his family and other Muslims who had gathered there for 
protection were dragged out by the mob and killed, despite the fact that these families lived in 
an upper-middle class neighbourhood. The report by an independent fact-finding mission 
stated that the police commissioner in Ahmedabad commanded a total of 10,000 men, 
including 3,000 armed men and 16 companies of the State Reserve Police, yet mobs of about 
                                                 
4 The chart is prepared for illustrative purposes and not for any substantive analytical objective. For the 
measurement of intensity of a conflict, two indicators (number of people killed and number of people injured) 
have been taken. Certain other important indicators, such as time span of rioting and destruction of property, 
have not been taken into account because no reliable data is available for comparison purposes. To measure the 
intensity of a riot, each killing in a riot has been given a value of 3 and an injury a value of 1. 
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5,000 could run amok, loot, rape, beat and murder. The police stood by when it did not 
actively abet the mobs (Chenoy et al. 2002: 15). A Human Rights Watch report stated that 
attacks took place in the vicinity of police stations and posts, with the police often firing on 
Muslims. The army was called in only after thirty-six hours, but troops were not deployed 
until the violence had caused hundreds of victims (Human Rights Watch 2002).  
 
Thirdly, whereas earlier riots had more or less taken place in old Ahmedabad, particularly the 
walled city and the industrial areas, this time the entire city was affected. Notably, middle-
class families and upper-caste and class women took an active part in the looting of designer 
shops and jewellery stores.  The report of Human Rights Watch (2002) observed that the 
‘under-class was supported in the looting by the middle-and upper-middle classes, including 
women. They not only indulged in pillaging but openly celebrated the destruction and the 
mounting death toll.’   
 
More disturbingly, for the most part civil society organisations in Ahmedabad either kept 
silent or participated in the violence. Breman (2004: 292) suggests that but for ‘a few 
exceptions, the institutions that represent civil society took no action at all when this horrific 
violence broke out’. T. K. Oommen (2008: 74-5), writing on reconciliation attempts in the 
aftermath of the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat, arrives at the same conclusion. Although a number 
of civil society organisations are active in the city, it continued to be wracked by violence for 
more than two months. What is more troublesome, writes Oomen, is that a section of civil 
society organisations, mainly the militant Hindu ones (the RSS, the VHP, and the Bajrang 
Dal) actively participated in the violence against the Muslims. Though some civil society 
organisation began to mobilise legal, psychological and material aid to the victims in the 
relief camp, on the whole organisations did not protest against the violence, or against the 
failure of the government to protect its own citizens. Some radical groups in Ahmedabad told 
our research team that it was difficult to get civil society organisations onto the street to 
demonstrate against the pogrom, and against state failure to rehabilitate the victims and give 
them justice, even on the sixth and seventh anniversary of the Godhra and post-Godhra 
violence. 
 
It cannot be said that no civil society exists in Ahmedabad, because since the turn of the 
twentieth century a number of social organisations in the city have initiated programmes of 
social reform and social welfare, a trade union movement has worked for the interest of the 
industrial work force and housing associations have established residential communities. 
During the struggle against colonialism, against P.M. Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian regime 
and against the internal emergency imposed by her government (between 1975 and 1977) the 
city witnessed frenetic political activity in defence of civil and political rights. Yet 
organisations in Ahmedabad’s civil society can also be held responsible for violent acts 
against the lower castes, and against the religious minority in particular, and for the creation 
of a segmented and divided city in general. That some civil society organisations have 
practiced the politics of discrimination and hate is not surprising, because civil society as a 
plural space also contains collectives that possess a will for violence. What is surprising is 
that democratic organisations in Ahmedabad have not battled such practices, and thus 
constituted civil society as a contested and democratic space. 
 
There are two ways in which we can begin to understand this phenomenon. One, the history 
of civil society organisations in the city is the history of philanthropy and voluntary sector 
involvement in social work and reform. In the first few years of the twentieth century, 
industrialists in the city had set up the Swadeshi Mitra Mandal, an organisation that had tried 
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to raise awareness among the workforce through adult education. Social reform, particularly 
in the field of hygiene, health care, adult education and schooling for the children of the 
working class, was initiated by Anusuyaben Sarabhai, the sister of the one of the biggest 
textile magnates in the city. She helped establish the ‘Friends of Labourers Society’ in 1916, 
which set up credit facilities for the workers. Though these and other organisations have 
contributed to the amelioration of poverty and to development, they have tended to stay away 
from either politically mobilising the people, or confronting the government (Majumdar 1973: 
76-7). The labour union that was established by Gandhi carried on this tradition of social 
work and social reform. The Textile Labour Association, which was based on notions of 
partnership with capital, failed to establish a radical working-class culture in the city. It 
certainly failed, as will be discussed below, to replace a conservative social ethos based on 
caste and religious affiliations, with an ethos of working-class solidarity. Significantly, 
neither Ahmedabad, nor indeed Gujarat, has seen an anti-caste movement that could overturn 
caste hierarchy, challenge conservatism and pave the way for the consolidation of an 
egalitarian spirit in the city and in the state.5   
 
Still there is no reason to suppose that the most conservative of societies are immune or 
insensitive to the spectacle of violence, bloodshed and mayhem that has been ritually played 
out in Ahmedabad’s neighbourhoods and work places, or that they are ready to participate in 
them. Social and even cultural conservatism is not synonymous with blood lust. Groups may 
not interact with each other in the social domain, but this does not mean that they set about 
systematically exterminating each other in the most brutal of ways possible. There is, after all, 
a major difference between the consolidation of hard communal prejudices in a society, and 
outbursts of inhuman communal violence. Communal prejudice may be an essential 
precondition for violence, but it is not enough. The translation of communal sentiments into 
violence demands a trigger; and the construction of the trigger involves, as will be discussed 
below, an entire host of distinct processes. Therefore, the explanation that since civil society 
organisations in Ahmedabad are more tuned to social reform instead of democratic politics, 
they did not protest against the employment of violence, is simply not persuasive. 
 
The second explanation is infinitely more disturbing. Is it possible that civil society in 
Ahmedabad has failed to protest against major transgressions of basic human rights because it 
has become accustomed to violence? If civil society does not erupt in protest against the 
deliberate infringement of every basic human right, something must have gone wrong in the 
constitution of this sphere. Is perchance civil society familiar with violence? Is indifference to 
violence, or even participation in violent acts, a constitutive aspect of civil society? 
 
The irony is that Ahmedabad was the site of Gandhi’s experiments in truth and non-violence. 
But these lessons, it appears, were half-heartedly internalised in the collective psyche. In 
1919, reports of Gandhiji’s detention by the colonial government swept the city, and mob 
violence led to the jail, the telegraph office and the Collectors’ office being set on fire. The 
Gandhian lesson of non-violence, it seemed, was soon forgotten. But at the same time 
Gandhians walked the streets to counsel patience and reassure the workers. Regrettably no 
Gandhian has walked the streets during the frightening communal riots that have become a 
recurrent feature of the city. In 2002, when Muslims fleeing murderous mobs tried to seek 
refuge in the Sabarmati Ashram, which had been established by Gandhi as a project in inter-
caste and inter-communal harmony, the ashram closed its doors ostensibly in order to protect 
its property. The substantial Jain community in the city is wedded to the doctrine of non-
                                                 
5 I am indebted to Ghanshyam Shah for this insight into Ahmedabad 
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violence; but this tradition has not found root in civil society. The community has kept silent 
in the face of tremendous brutality wreaked against the Muslim community. Numerous holy 
men who head a number of religious orders, each of which preaches the imperative of coming 
to peace with the world and with oneself, also kept quiet; and if some civil society 
organisations kept mute in the face of massive transgression of basic civil rights, and the 
complicity of state officials and the police in the violence unleashed on Muslims, others, 
particularly organisations belonging to the Hindu right wing, were actively involved in the 
violence. A natural consequence is that groups that are dedicated to democracy and to battling 
fascist groups are rendered helpless.  
 
Civil society in Ahmedabad, it is painfully clear, has failed to bring people together in shared 
projects. The question is why? Ashutosh Varshney (2002: 277-8) has argued that in 
Ahmedabad the post-independence decline of integrated associations was not a consequence 
of communal riots, but that communal riots were a consequence of a prior decline of 
organisations that bound Hindus and Muslims together in large numbers. He identifies the 
Congress Party and the Textile Labour Association as two civil society organisations that 
managed to integrate the two communities, till the point that these organisations began to 
decline and degenerate. Our research has shown on the contrary that the reach of the Congress 
in Ahmedabad was limited, that a majority of the Muslims ceased to partner the Congress in 
political agitations after the 1920s, and that the Textile Labour Association was itself 
organised on the basis of caste and religious units. It was therefore unable to transcend either 
segmented identities, or provide a radical working-class identity that could subsume 
particularistic identities often poised against each other. In Ahmedabad, the very 
preconditions for engagement in the spaces of civil society were markedly absent. Hindus and 
Muslims have lived in segmented spaces since the inception of the city, and violence between 
the two communities has been an ongoing phenomenon up to the present day – and since the 
mid-1980s, the cadres of the Sangh Parivar have acted as a catalytic agent for this, armed as 
they were with a mission to unite the Hindus by focussing on an external enemy. When the 
BJP came to power in the state, the communal agenda of the cadres of the right acquired both 
legitimacy and political power. In the face of this highly organised and targeted onslaught, the 
members of the Muslim community were rendered helpless, civil society was immobilised 
and many of its own organisations participated actively in the violence.  
 
This paper argues that civil society in Ahmedabad has been rendered helpless because certain 
preconditions for a democratic and vibrant civil society have been weakly articulated and 
inadequately institutionalised in the city. These preconditions are as follows. One, the 
consequences of exclusionary identity-producing and reproducing processes should have been 
mediated through other processes and transactions outside the metaphorical boundaries of 
civil society. Two, the state should possess rigorous control over the means and deployment 
of violence. And three one ethnic identity should not become a state-making project, or take 
over the state. The paper also suggests that the potential of civil society organisations to battle 
undemocratic organisations, as well as an undemocratic state, is severely truncated when: (a) 
members are irrevocably divided outside the boundaries of civil society; (b) one ethnic group 
takes on a state-making project; (c) the state in the service of this ethnic group deploys power 
against the minorities; and (d) the state does not penalise groups that employ violence against 
innocent people.  
 
The paper is divided into four parts: in the first, the city of Ahmedabad is briefly profiled and 
its history of residential segregation are detailed; the second deals with political movements; 
the third section details the textile industry and the politics of trade unionism; and the fourth 
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details the rise of the Hindu right. The concluding section brings together the argument in the 
various sections to generate some propositions on the failure of civil society in Ahmedabad. 
 
Ahmedabad and Residential Segregation 
The city of Ahmedabad, which lies on the banks of the Sabarmati River in Western India, is 
located in one of the most urbanised and industrialised parts of the state of Gujarat, of which 
it is one of the largest cities, and the seventh largest urban agglomeration in the country. The 
Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, set up by the central government in 
December 2005, declared Ahmedabad to be one of India’s eight mega cities, and announced a 
new development programme for the city. On 14 February 2006, the Gujarat state government 
extended the city boundary, merging in the process seven peripheral municipalities into the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC). The city area has now increased from 198 to 500 
square kilometres, and the 2001 census showed that the population of the AMC was 3.52 
million. The Muslim community constitutes 15 percent of the population, slightly more than 
the all-India figure of about 13 percent. The demographic strength of the Muslim population 
has as a matter of course declined since the partition of India. The special report on the city in 
the 1961 census calculated that the Hindus, who accounted for 69.67 percent of the total 
population of the city in 1901, had gradually risen to 76.94 percent; while the Muslim 
population fell from 20.53 percent to 15.51 percent during the same period, probably due to 
migration to Pakistan in 1947 (Government of India 1962: 203).  
 
Ahmedabad is geographically divided into eastern and the western parts by the river; and the 
two parts are connected by five bridges. The city consists of four distinct regions: the old city; 
the industrial belt; the relatively new western districts; and the suburban region that falls 
outside the boundaries of the AMC, but within the Urban Development Authority. The 
industrial belt is located in the eastern periphery, and is dominated by one-room housing units 
(chawls), which originally housed mill workers, and slums. Mahadevia (2002: 4851) 
estimates that though this part contains about 44 percent of the housing units in the AMC, it 
also contains 75 percent of chawl units and 47 percent of slum units.  Workers in the largely 
informal economy live in these degraded housing clusters, very often built on illegally 
occupied land. The worst excesses of the 2002 pogrom occurred in these areas, particularly in 
Naroda Patiya, where almost a hundred Muslims lost their lives. The spatial organisation of 
the western part is radically different to that of the eastern: less congested, more affluent, 
more spacious and certainly better serviced than the old city. Western Ahmedabad is a 
predominantly upper-class area, yet 22 percent of its population still lives in slums. Of the 
total housing units of this area, 28 percent are slum areas (Mahadevia 2002: 4851).  
 
According to the 2001 census, literacy levels in the city are 73.3 percent: about ten percent 
higher than the Indian aggregate. The state of Gujarat tops the country in terms of per capita 
income, and is one of the richest states in India mainly because it has been able to take full 
advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation. This is the particular case with 
Ahmedabad. In the wake of the collapse of the textile industry in the mid-1980s, which led to 
the closure of 50 out of 72 mills, the city has diversified its industrial base, and made inroads 
into the financial and services sectors. Chemical and petrochemical industries have replaced 
textiles as the largest component in manufacturing, and these sectors account for 29 percent of 
total manufacturing. The city has attracted foreign direct investment in various sectors, 
mainly in infrastructure and real estate development. A River Front Development Plan, worth 
approximately 12,000 million rupees, is already under way. The objective of this plan is to 
develop a central business district on both sides of the river Sabarmati (Mahadevia and Brar 
2006: 1).  The spatial effects of globalisation are also more than evident. What used to be 
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working-class tenements have been converted into malls, restaurants and cinemas; and the old 
disused textile mills have been converted into office blocks. 
 
Historically, Ahmedabad has been an important centre of trade The city was founded in 1411 
by the Gujarat Sultan, Ahmad Shah (after whom the city has been named), at the intersection 
of caravan routes to Rajasthan, Delhi, Malwa, Sind with its port of Tatta (Lahari Bandar) and 
to the ports of Cambay, Surat and Broach (Gillion 1969: 14). It controlled key trade routes 
with the North, East, West and South of the country, and is situated in the midst of a cotton-
growing belt. These two factors motivated Sultan Ahmad Shah of the Gujarat Sultanate to 
establish a city close to where an earlier trading centre namely Asaval or Karnavati stood 
(Chaudhri 2001: 679; Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 9).6 The city, which was built on the banks of 
the Sabarmati river; fifty miles from the mouth of the river, and 173 feet above mean sea 
level, replaced both Karnavati and Patan, the old capital, as the most important city of the 
Gujarat region. The old walled city covered an area of two square miles, and the walls were 
completed in 1487. Among the first few settlements in the city were the Badra Fort, Amir 
Settlements (around the area of the city which is now known as Gandhi Road) Shahi Maidan, 
Teen Darwaza and the Jumma Masjid that was built in the 15th century. The second wall, 
which had ten gates, was constructed by the Mughals. After 1532, settlements began to 
proliferate within the walled area. Subsequently, the city expanded spatially to include Puras 
(suburbs) outside the walled city. Ahmed Shah encouraged merchants, weavers and skilled 
craftsmen to settle in Ahmedabad, so that the city could develop as a flourishing weaving and 
trading centre.  
 
A hundred years of growth was followed by sixty years of decay as the Gujarat Sultanate 
declined, and trade passed into the hands of the Portuguese. Ahmedabad recovered some if its 
reputation and prosperity in 1572 after it became a part of the Mughal Empire, and more 
importantly the seat of the Mughal Viceroy of Gujarat. During the period of Mughal rule, 
whereas the court officials and skilled weavers were Muslim, the financiers and traders were 
generally Hindus and Jain. The only exception to this rule was the Bohra Muslim community 
that traded in silk and other goods. The wealth of Ahmedabad was, therefore, controlled by 
the Hindus and Jains, especially by the old, established family firms, from the very beginning. 
These families possessed hereditary monopoly over trading transactions, and were, therefore, 
in a position to finance the Mughal court. The well established and highly respected Sarafi 
families acted as bankers, dealt in each other’s hundis (cheques for payments over distances), 
changed coins, acted as the paymasters of the army, and as financiers to princes and 
merchants, provided insurance, served as trustees for religious and charitable purposes and 
sometimes engaged in commercial activities on their own account (Gillion 1969: 17).  
 
During the eighteenth century the city declined once again with the disintegration of the 
Mughal Empire. Ahmedabad was ruled jointly by the Muslims and Marathas from 1738 to 
1753. In 1757 it came completely under the control of the Maratha Kings. Until 1817, when it 
was annexed by the East India Company, the city was almost deserted. Under the control of 
the East India Company the city once again revived, and was transformed into a modern 
industrial city (Gillion, 1969, p.14-17). 
 
Whereas Muslims exercised power during the period of the Gujarat dynasty and Mughal rule 
as influential officials of the court, once the city fell into the hands of the Hindu Maratha 
                                                 
6 With the disintegration of the Delhi Sultanate in 1394,  the Governor of Gujarat declared independence from 
the Delhi Sultans in 1403. Thus was the Gujarat Sultanate, which came to be known as the Ahmadshahi, founded 
by Ahmad Shah’s grandfather.  
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kings, the community lost its power. Thereafter, a majority of the Muslims remained, mainly 
as weavers, while control over trade, commerce, finance and later administration was 
monopolised by the Hindus and Jains. The only section of the Muslim community that 
retained its wealth was the Bohra community. Clearly the fortunes of the Hindu and the 
Muslims waxed and waned according to the religious persuasion of the elite that controlled 
the city.  
 
If the structure of manufacture, trade, commerce and labour reflected the unequal balance of 
power between the three main communities (Hindus, Jains and Muslims) in the post-Mughal 
period, this unequal balance was spatially reflected in the residential patterns of the city, 
which have remained to this day. Mahadevia writes that the city is:  
..segmented in terms of levels of living, quality of housing, and availability of 
basic services. The process of exclusion starts from the segmented city structure, 
which was earlier segmented on the basis of class but now on the basis of religion. 
(Mahadevia 2002: 4851).7 
But this feature of Ahmedabad is not new; it was a constitutive aspect of the very manner in 
which the city was structured historically. Within the walled city residential, commercial and 
religious spaces were closely juxtaposed to each other. However, the residential pattern of the 
city was characterised by two distinct kinds of housing clusters for the Hindus and Muslims, 
with the former living in caste-defined clusters known as the Pols and the latter in Mohallas 
(Gillion 1969: 25; Doshi 1974: 74). The word Pol is derived from the Sanskrit word pratoli, 
which means entrance to an enclosed area. This entrance or gate was generally known by the 
name of the community that inhabited the closed area. The Pols and Mohallas marked the 
clustering of the city population predominantly on religious lines, but the Pols themselves 
were organized largely on the basis of caste. Until the late nineteenth century, owners of the 
Pol would sell land within the area to people of their own caste. In 1872, there were 356 Pols 
in Ahmedabad, and some of them exist until today (Gillion, 1969, 25).8 Within the pols were 
situated a quadrangle, a temple, a well and common toilets. To some extent residential 
property in the pol was held in common. The residents of the pol maintained the area by 
collecting funds through fines, sale of house property and gifts (Doshi, 1974, 74). 
In 1714, violence between Hindus and Muslims accelerated the move towards separate living. 
Communal violence was precipitated by the festival of Holi, which, marking the advent of 
spring, involves people throwing colour on each other. One historian on the basis of records 
narrates the origins of what is possibly the first communal riot in Ahmedabad:  
At the doors of his [Madan Gopal’s] house, Hari Ram was indulging himself in 
enthusiastically playing Holi with a group of sarafs and companions…pouring 
colour, smearing gulal in a bacchanalian manner…as is their custom. Perchance, a 
Muslim happened to pass through that street and fell in with them. Taking hold of 
him, they showered colour, gulal, and dust, and abuses on him…He, considering 
                                                 
7 The puras that once formed the seat of Mughal officers, declined after the fall of the Mughal Empire. But the 
puras founded by the Hindu merchants extended the economic life of the main city into the suburbs. The suburb 
of Madhavpura, for instance, was founded by the Nagarsheth’s family in Maratha times. The Pura was composed 
of a square surrounded by shops and warehouse, and the family was granted the right to levy dues on the cart 
men who brought their goods to sell in this secure market place. Similarly because the suburb of Raghunathpura 
“was in a ruinous state and Vukhutchand Seth has been the means of causing the same Pura to be inhabited,” he 
was granted under the Marathas, the right to collect dues on the carts of grain and the cattle brought to the 
suburbs (Gillion, 1969, 19). 
8  Today some pols remain such as  Mhurat Pol, Mandvi-ni-Pol and Lakha Patel-ni-Pol. 
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the situation, got away by some means and, in that very condition, took some 
people and went to intimate to his holiness…Muhammed Ali. 
The complaint to Muhammed Ali, who was a sermon giver and who was consequently seized 
by ‘regard for the honour of Islam and the cause of the true faith’, bore somewhat expected 
results. Ali went to the mosque, met people of his own sect, and subsequently Muslims 
‘arrived in groups and bands from every nook and corner shouting ‘faith, faith’’ (Haider 
2005: 129). A general concourse and assemblage of Muslims took place, and determined that 
Hindus should be killed and their property destroyed, resulting in riot and lawlessness, murder 
and plunder. The crowd ransacked and set fire to shops in the cloth market and vandalised the 
property of the sarafs. It then turned to the house of Madan Gopal and other Hindu 
households. The fight between the barricaded households and the crowd continued for two 
days, and was only dampened when the Governor sent troops to quell the confrontation. The 
Ahmedabad riot of 1714, notes Haider, was the only incident of its kind in the recorded 
history of the city from 1411 AD to 1761. Though the riot was caused by professional 
commercial rivalry and was confined to a particular locality (Gillion 1969: 144), and was 
contained by the Muslim administration in two days, it seems to have intensified not only the 
trend for separate living, but also the construction of barricades in distinct clusters for 
purposes of defence. The Pol normally had one entrance, and this was barricaded and locked. 
Therefore, whereas within the walled city the Pol and the Mohalla bred intense interaction 
within each community, these spatial forms also served to pre-empt social interaction with the 
members of the other community, and thus generated distrust.  
 
The Making of a Modern Town  
The revival of business and manufacturing activity in the city, the introduction of railways 
that connected Ahmedabad with markets in the rest of India, the development of ports that 
allowed textiles to be shipped to Europe, particularly during the time of the American civil 
war, and the general intensification of trade created favourable conditions for the growth of 
the textile industry (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 102). This attracted migrants, and the population 
of the city swelled with the entry of non-Gujarati speaking migrants from other parts of the 
country. Though the first cotton mills were established within the walled city, subsequent 
mills were located in the east beyond the railway line, with this district becoming an industrial 
area. Here, working people lived in group housing units, or chawls, built by the mill owners 
in villages like Saraspur, Rakhial, and Gomtipur, which subsequently became absorbed by the 
expansion of Ahmedabad. The chawl, which consisted of one-room housing, common toilets 
and a common playground, was generally under-serviced, and marked by acute deterioration 
of the environment. In these chawls, caste Hindus lived in clusters; and other residential 
clusters consisted of low-caste Hindus and Muslims. Muslim chawls were located close to the 
dalit chawls, and both the communities were excluded from upper-caste houses. The practice 
of living in pols, however, continued, with the pol becoming even more exclusionary, with 
outsiders prevented from entering through the raising of rents, and stringent conditions of 
sale.  
 
The number of textile mills rose from 60 in 1931 to 81 in 1941, and with the development of 
various other ancillary industries that gave to boost to trade and commerce, economic activity 
swelled (Government of India 1962: part E-section 2, p 43). In 1941, the city recorded the 
highest percentage growth of population (90.43 percent), having almost doubled since 1931, 
from 310,000 to 591,267. Given the juxtaposition of textile mills, chawls, narrow streets and 
market places in the industrial belt, as well as congestion in the walled city, some of the 
wealthier inhabitants began to migrate across the river to the western part of the city. By the 
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late 1960s, three Ahmedabads had been established: the first, the old walled city in which the 
upper castes, dalits and Muslims lived cheek by jowl but in their own Pols; the second, the 
industrial townships growing around the textile mills in the eastern periphery of the old city, 
mainly inhabited by dalit and Muslim textile workers who together formed two-thirds of the 
working population; and the third, separated from the earlier areas, which grew across the 
river Sabarmati. After the decline of the mills in the early 1980s and the rise of power looms, 
chemical factories, diamond polishing units and other small scale industries, the city extended 
southwards attracting immigrants from Saurashtra, Hindi-speaking areas of northern India and 
from areas as far south as the river Godavari.  
 
As the city extended, practices of residential segregation in the Pol and in segregated chawls 
were reproduced in new forms. In the newly developed part, which was largely formed by 
out-migration from the old city, housing societies bought land, subdivided it and developed 
residential accommodation for individuals and families. But since housing societies were 
formed by caste and religious groups, it was relatively easy for them to cater for their own 
community and exclude people from other communities, and even other castes. In short, the 
exclusions of housing clusters in the old city were spatially reproduced in the new city, with 
most housing societies determining who should, or should not, live there. Unlike classical 
theories of capitalism according to which land becomes a mere commodity in capitalist 
societies, in Ahmedabad land was closely connected to religious and caste hierarchy. The 
built form became the spatial signifier of the status, or the lack thereof, of the community that 
lived in it. Whereas these housing societies provided for both Muslim and Hindu 
communities, a majority of the Muslims continued to live in the old city, in residential areas 
that under sustained civic neglect rapidly degenerated into slums (including Dariapur, 
Kalupur, Gomtipur, Behrampur, Bapu Nagar, Jamalpur, and Shahipur).Our research has 
shown that it is precisely in these areas that the worst communal riots have taken place (see 
Annex 1). Narrow streets, congestion and clusters of Muslim families living together have 
enabled rioters to target closely packed houses – for example by throwing petrol bombs over 
the walls, and setting fire to one house. By the late 1960s even these Muslim families were 
forced to leave their homes and places of work, and the major riot of 1969 was to mark the 
onset of ghettoisation.  
 
This was the time when Juhapura came to be seen as a refuge for the victims of violence. 
Juhapura is one of the largest settlements of the Muslim community, containing about 
300,000 people – about 46 percent of the total Muslim community in the Urban 
Agglomeration.  Juhapura borders the Vejalpur area, which is Hindu-dominated. The 
inhabitants of Ahmedabad pejoratively type the road between the two areas as the ‘border’, 
and Juhapura is known as a mini Pakistan. The implications of this stereotyping are clear: for 
Hindus who belong to the right wing, Muslim-dominated Pakistan is the prime enemy. 
Originally Juhapura consisted of poor Muslim households, but after 2002 affluent Muslim 
families have also moved into the area. The expansion of population in the area has, however, 
not been matched by the provision of services. Juhapura falls outside the boundaries of the 
AMC and most of the land is agricultural, and lacks infrastructure and services. As it is what 
is euphemistically termed in India an ‘unauthorised colony’, Juhapura is not entitled to health 
facilities, power supply, roads, drainage and street lighting. Whatever infrastructure has been 
created in the area, from micro-credit networks, to roads, schools, shops, eating places and 
mosques, has been built with private funds given by Muslim philanthropic organisations. The 
area is not connected to the city by public transport since it is located on the highway. 
Therefore, its residents have been deprived of employment, along with access to good schools 
and health facilities. 
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Though the ghettoisation process began in 1969, some Hindus and Muslims still continued to 
live in mixed neighbourhoods. Within these neighbourhoods, the two communities lived in 
discrete housing clusters separated by a fence or a street.  By the 1980s the ghettoisation 
process intensified, and by the 1990s only a few mixed neighbourhoods remained (Yagnik 
and Sheth 2005: 230). These were the mixed communities that were systematically targeted in 
the violence of 2002, the horrific details of which, along with the depth of residential 
segregation that ensued, I describe elsewhere (Chandhoke, 2009). To summarise here, neither 
the state government nor most of organised civil society within the city acted to support the 
victims of the violence in rebuilding their lives.9 The only assistance the communities had 
was from Islamic relief organisations who, in filling the gaps left by the inaction of the state 
and most of civil society extracted their own price, organising the victimised communities in 
poverty-stricken settlements without clear property rights where dependency on these 
organisations has been maintained.  
 
Today Ahmedabad has few residential colonies with mixed populations and is divided almost 
completely into Hindu- and Muslim-inhabited areas. The slide from segmented 
neighbourhoods to ghettos and the spatial marginalisation of the Muslims is the most 
powerful symbol of their economic, political and social exclusion from the city life. 
Consequently, a city that had been characterised by different patterns of residential ordering 
right from its establishment in 1411 is now reorganised on the principle of ‘single community 
areas’ where no intercommunity mixing is possible (Chaudhary 2007).  Whereas the Hindus 
have options to live in various residential areas, Muslims have no such option. Hindus live 
both in the poverty-stricken and in the affluent areas of the city, while Muslims live in areas 
that are not only poverty-stricken, but also deprived of basic amenities, often outside the pale 
of governance, and subjected to rank and vicious stereotyping and abuses by the majority 
community. In the process, an entire religious minority has been downgraded from citizen to 
subject.  
 
More seriously the spatial marginalisation of the Muslim community carries serious 
implications for our understanding of communal harmony. Spatial segregation means that the 
children of one community have absolutely no interaction with the children of the other 
community. No mixed schools, no playgrounds in which children of both communities can 
interact, no extra curricula activities that can form the basis of a future solidarity, and no 
personal friendships that involve visiting each other’s homes and dining will inevitably 
produce and reproduce alienation from the other community. Further, the spatial divide means 
that people of different communities are not easily able to access the domain of private 
transactions – i.e. friendships, associational life, dining with others, inter-marrying or indeed 
membership of social clubs. This has transformed the realm of “the private”, which deeply 
affects society in two ways. First, it is essential that no one should be barred from a world that 
allows for emotional support systems, formation of friendships, and participation in the 
fullness of social transactions of a given society. The second is instrumental. We know that 
political and economic transactions do not always fall entirely in either the public domain or 
in the domain of the market. It is precisely the private domain of social transactions that 
guarantees the acquisition of both social skills, which are indispensable for acquiring and 
retaining jobs, and influential contacts, which are necessary for the same. Where we spend 
our time and with whom, who our children go to school with, what neighbourhood we live in, 
what clubs we belong to, and what sort of persons our children marry, have an inescapable 
                                                 
9 Elsewhere (Chandhoke, 2009) I give an account of the few civil society organisations, like Aman Biradri and 
Jan Vikas that have provided support and whose advocacy and action has ensure that the plight of these victims 
has not been totally ignored. 
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effect on material things like jobs, promotions, and prestigious placements. Thus residential 
segregation narrows the cultural and the political horizons of communities, closes off options, 
pre-empts creative mingling of perspectives, and prevents the forging of other sorts of 
identity. Social interaction with persons who are ‘not like us’, prepares the ground for coming 
together in civil society, and appreciation of social and cultural differences contributes to the 
development of reflective and critical judgment. None of this prevails in civil society in 
Ahmedabad because social interaction is more or less prevented through separate as well as 
unequal neighbourhoods.  
 
In sum, residential segregation in the city of Ahmedabad has been both a cause of, as well as 
an outcome of, social discrimination. After 1969, when the Muslims were gradually forced 
into ghettos, not only were these ghettos labelled as ‘mini Pakistans’, their way of life and 
their sensibilities were simply rendered invisible. It is infinitely easier to target the lives and 
the properties of a community when it is removed from the mainstream of social life both 
spatially and symbolically. Geographical distances may not measure up to much in crowded 
cities, but when these residential neighbourhoods are both spatially and symbolically isolated 
the distance between the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ becomes much more unbridgeable. Since mixed 
neighbourhoods were simply not set in place in Ahmedabad – and this may be considered a 
precondition for solidarity in civil society – the two communities remained threatening to 
each other. 
 
Participation in Political Movements 
A second precondition for the mediation and the modification of primary ethnic identities is 
shared participation in political struggles. Ahmedabad was active in the freedom struggle 
against colonialism, led by the Indian National Congress, but the majority of the Muslim 
community does not seem to have participated in this, or participated only partially. There 
might have been good reasons for the inability of the political leadership of the movement to 
forge a political coalition against colonialism, but the lack of such shared participation is 
nevertheless regrettable.  Struggle against an identified or an identifiable enemy, whether this 
enemy is tangible such as the colonial power, or intangible such as corruption and 
exploitation, forges bonds of solidarity among groups who may be socially and culturally 
removed from each other. Arguably, inter group solidarity can emerge only in and through 
political practices, because these practices are constitutive of political identities.  
 
One of the ways in which unity among different communities and castes in India was forged, 
was in and through the struggle for freedom from British colonialism. The umbrella-like anti-
colonial movement brought within its ambit a variety of different groups, each of which 
articulated its own specific demands, such as the demand for post-independence linguistic 
states or for social justice. But these demands were made within the overarching demand for 
independence. It cannot be said that the prime political objectives of forging unity among 
religious groups was a complete success, because the independence of India in 1947 also 
brought the partition of the country. The leadership of the Muslim League opted to exit the 
country and establish a state of its own. But it also cannot be said that the movement was a 
complete failure for at least two reasons: firstly, more Muslims stayed behind in India than 
migrated to Pakistan; and secondly, the Indian leadership held fast to its commitment to 
secularism and minority rights, even though the Constituent Assembly deliberated in the 
shadow of the mass killings that stamped the partition of the country. This should have 
reassured the minorities that they would not suffer even if they were in a minority, and sent a 
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message to the majority that it could not ride roughshod over the aspirations of minority 
groups even if it was in a majority. 
 
In 1902, Ahmedabad hosted the eighteenth session of the Indian National Congress 
(Government of India 1962: Vol 1, Part E, p 29); and with Gandhi settling there in 1915 the 
city rapidly became the epicentre of the national movement. Erik Ericson (1969, 258) in his 
study of Gandhi’s Truth asks why Gandhi chose to establish himself in Ahmedabad - the 
“Manchester of India”, suggesting that it was because Ahmedabad is “a true city. It breathed, 
if one may say so, the logic of mercantile life, for its industry had grown from native crafts to 
small enterprises and to a large industry by an uninterrupted process so consistent that it could 
truly be said to have a corporate identity. This gave it a character both solid and limited, both 
strong and ingrown, both alive and isolated, by which it has been able to household through 
the centuries a remarkable energy.” Gandhi choose Ahmedabad, wrote Erikson, because he 
himself spoke Gujarati and in Ahmedabad Gujarati had always been spoken, studied, and 
cultivated, because the city was an ancient seat of handloom weaving, because it had also 
become the centre of the most modern weapons of spinning and weaving, and because the 
weaving tradition was deeply embedded in a system which made guilds, caste, and religion 
intimately interdependent. Gandhi was “to call for a rapid modernization of awareness and 
aspirations and yet also acknowledge those aspects of the ancient social structure which alone 
could provide irreplaceable elements of a traditional identity…Gandhi could do not better 
than to settle in a modern place that had preserved some ancient structure, so that from there 
he could travel and study” (Ericson, 1969, 260-61). 
 
Gandhi founded two noted periodicals - Navjivan and Young India - through which he could 
mould public opinion on a host of matters. By undertaking a number of related but distinct 
endeavours, Gandhi sought not only to mobilise massive numbers of people against 
colonialism, but also to give to them an expanded concept of freedom. This expanded concept 
of freedom, or swaraj, laid forth several tasks before the country: the abolition of 
discrimination, the transcendence of religious and caste divisions, and inculcation of the 
virtues of toleration and non-violence. In short, Gandhi tried to draft a blueprint of a society 
that was based on ethical principles, in which there was no room for religious strife or 
communal disharmony. As Mehta (2005: 297) wrote: 
[He] extended the political horizon of Ahmedabad and skilfully linked city 
politics with the aspirations of the rural and the urban masses. He created a band 
of grass roots workers…who tried to understand the language of the masses. He 
established rapport with the low caste people, women, harijans, and 
adivasis…Gandhi in a very real sense, affected the rhythm of history. 
The same painstaking and committed efforts went into the forging of Hindu-Muslim 
solidarity. In the course of a speech, Gandhi introduced Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the 
president of one of the biggest Islamic associations in the country (Mehta 2005: 297), who 
had shown an early commitment to Hindu-Muslim unity (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 206). 10 In 
the same speech, Gandhi also acclaimed the pragmatic traditions of Ahmedabad, which he felt 
would enable the coming together of Hindus and Muslims, and of the extremists and 
moderates (Mehta 2005: 297). In Hind Swaraj, which has by now attained the stature of a 
classic, Gandhi rejected the imperial premise that the two communities were at odds with 
each other, and that they could never live together in one country. He observed that on the 
                                                 
10 Muhammed Ali Jinnah, who was initially committed to Hindu-Muslim unity  Makrand Mehta, ‘Gandhi and 
Ahmedabad, 1915-20’ p 297 
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contrary Hindus and Muslims had historically cooperated with each other for a common 
cause. Sharply positioning himself against organic conceptions of the nation and against 
majoritarianism, Gandhi strictly warned against dreams of a Hindu-dominated India and 
argued that all communities who had made India their homeland were fellow countrymen. 
Addressing the Gurja Sabha of Bombay in 1915, Gandhi reiterated that Hindus and Muslims 
were the two precious eyes of India.  Prominent Muslims of Ahmedabad – such as 
Nizamuddin Quereshi, Badruddi Tyabji, Abbas Tiayabji and his daughter Rehana Begum, 
Nurmiya Sheikh and others – were closely associated with the Congress Party and with the 
struggle (Mehta 2005: 298).  
 
But when it came to the majority of the Muslim community matters were different. The 
Congress leadership failed to reach out to the Muslims; and because the separatist Muslim 
League built up a formidable organisation in the city, leaders such as Jinnah, who had 
subsequently swung over to the notion that Hindus and Muslims constituted two nations, were 
able to mobilise the city’s inhabitants behind their cause, leading to many in the Muslim 
community staying away from Congress and the independence struggle, especially after 1920. 
Varshney (2002: 224-5) has argued that the most vibrant, disciplined and cadre-based 
Congress party organisation was established in Ahmedabad in the 1920s and the 1930s. 
Under the leadership of Gandhi, but more importantly Sardar Patel, the party reached all the 
way down to the neighbourhood and street levels. He concludes that Muslim participation in 
the movement was actually quite considerable, enabling the construction of several civic 
bridges between the Hindu and the Muslim communities. Even if these were not as many as 
the Congress leadership, committed to Hindu-Muslim unity, would have liked, it did ensure 
that in case of disturbances, substantial mechanisms for intercommunal communication would 
be available (Varshney 2002: 226).  
 
Nevertheless, the evidence shows that widespread participation by the Muslims in the apex 
struggles of the 1920s, 30s and 40s was not a constitutive feature of the national movement in 
Ahmedabad. After Jinnah resigned from the Congress in 1921, partly prompted by 
disagreements with Ghandi’s use of religion for political mobilisation (Hardiman 2006: 163), 
in general the Muslim community seems to have decided to stay away from the movement.11 
For instance, the citizens of Ahmedabad were at the forefront of the non-cooperation 
movement for the boycott of government titles, foreign goods, government-controlled schools 
and colleges, law courts and the legislature. The non-cooperation movement overlapped with 
the census operations in the city, which were boycotted by the Hindus and the Jains but not by 
the Muslims.12 The census report stated that ‘[a]s a general proposition it may be safely stated 
that the Muhammadans nowhere joined the boycott, in fact throughout the Presidency, the 
leaders rendered freely any assistance that was asked of them’. The report reiterated that ‘the 
boycott movement was confined to the Hindu and Jain elements in the city. So far as the 
Muhammedan community was concerned, it was wholly ineffective’ (Dracup and Sorley 
                                                 
11 In 1920, Gandhi launched the famed non-cooperation movement as a back-to-back movement with the 
Khilafat movement. The Khilafat movement, which was initiated in 1918 by Maulana Abdul Bari and the Ali 
brothers, supported the independence of the Ottoman Sultan as the Khalifa of all Muslims, and aimed at ensuring 
his suzerainty over holy places. The movement was supported by Gandhi, who felt that unity between Hindus 
and Muslims on this issue would lead to greater unity in general. In the next two years as a powerful anti 
colonial movement emerged, and Hindu Muslim unity reached its peak. But Gandhi’s support for the Khilafat 
movement also separated him from Jinnah, who felt that religion should not play a role in political mobilization. 
In 1921, Jinnah resigned from the Congress (Hardiman, 2006, 163). 
12 The 1931 census reported that in 1921 Gandhi had recommended that no hindrance be offered to census 
operations, because this was a work of great importance.  
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1932: 483, 494). In other words, significant sections of the Muslim community did not join 
hands with the Hindus and the Jains in the non-cooperation movement called for by Gandhi.  
 
The stance of the Muslim community was the outcome of a number of developments. In 
December 1921, the Congress met in Ahmedabad for its annual session; but differences broke 
out between Hindu and Muslim participants over the Moplah rebellion, in which Muslim 
cultivators on the Malabar Coast attacked their Hindu landlords and either killed or converted 
Hindu families.  Moreover, Gandhi had called for a peaceful boycott of the official welcome 
accorded to the Prince of Wales who arrived on 17 November 1921 in Bombay. That evening 
a large number of Hindus and Muslims attacked people who had attended the official 
reception, with the riots continuing for four days. Although Gandhi accepted responsibility 
for the violence, and went on a three days fast, he admonished Muslims for being the main 
perpetrators of the violence (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 208).  By mid-1922, the unity between 
Hindus and Muslims had collapsed, and henceforth the Muslims of Ahmedabad were to play 
a negligible role in the nationalist movement.  
 
The increasing distance between Muslims and Hindus in the city was also due to the larger 
colonial design to identify and separate the two communities along the axis of religion. 
Historians of British colonialism focus on the complex and intangible practices of the colonial 
state: the politics of enumeration that made groups aware of demographic balances and 
imbalances; the practices of colonial ethnography that tended to interpret clashes between 
communities as communal clashes; the practices of colonial officials who sought to 
administer populations on the basis of categories and stereotypes; and the way in which the 
colonised internalised these categories and stereotypes (Pandey 1990; Dirks 2001). In other 
words, the production of a colonial discourse influenced the manner in which the colonised 
came to think of themselves: as members of a religiously defined group rather than as the 
sovereign citizens of a modern state. As Yagnik and Sheth (2005: 198) write: 
For common Gujaratis… like their counterparts in the rest of the Indian 
subcontinent, caste and subcaste, sect and subsect identities were more tangible 
and real and were the categories they used for social classification rather than 
‘Hindu’ and ‘Muhammadan’ religious categories imposed by the census 
[administered by the colonial powers since the 1870s].  
Moreover, there were sects such as ‘Matiya’or ‘Piranapanthi’, and such groups as ‘Shekhada’ 
and ‘Molesalam’, in Gujarat that could not be categorised as either Hindu or Muslim. Forty 
years after the census was introduced, the Bombay Superintendant of the census classified 
members of such sects and groups as ‘Hindu Muhammedans’: 
The commissioner of census, E.A. Gait, said that though the persons in this 
category did not exceed 35,000 it ‘has perhaps served a very useful purpose in 
drawing prominent attention to the extremely indefinite character of the boundary 
line between different religions in India’. (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 198)  
However, by the twentieth century Gujarat had come to be known as a state where Hindus 
and Muslims could not get along and could not resolve their differences through any means 
other than increasingly barbaric violence (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 192). The politics of 
enumeration had not only bred divisiveness, but also hostility between the communities. 
 
A great deal has been written on the political consequences of separate electorates in 
legislative bodies. These consequences were not slight, because competition for community-
based seats led to political mobilisation on religious lines, competition among groups, an 
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awareness of cultural distinctiveness and ultimately to the demand for the establishment of 
Pakistan. After local self-government was introduced in 1883-84, half the seats in the 
municipalities and local boards were elected on a narrow franchise. In the first election to the 
municipality of Ahmedabad in 1883, nine Hindus and Jains, and three Parsis, were elected. 
The Muslims, the Patidar and the Vaishnava Vania communities failed to return a single 
candidate. ”Canvassing” writes Gillion (1969: 134-5),”had won the day in Ahmedabad’s first 
experience of modern politics and traditional standing had taken second place.” Colonial 
officers came to the opinion that not all the communities were represented in the local bodies, 
and that they could not be so represented through elections, given the politics of numbers. The 
government proceeded to nominate outstanding citizens and representatives of the minority 
community to the Municipal Commission (Gillion 1969: 35). Not only were different 
procedures instituted for electing or nominating members to the local bodies, the nominated 
members specifically represented identity groups. The introduction of separate electorates in 
the country in 1909 further strengthened the process of politicising identities for the purpose 
of mobilising votes and acquiring membership of legislative bodies. That such procedures 
would neutralise the formation of shared political identities through the freedom struggle 
could have been foretold. The two communities and their respective leaderships were pushed 
further apart, and the seeds of future bitterness and rivalry were successfully sowed.  
 
Before the late 1930s the Muslim community had not shown outright hostility to the 
Congress, but the divisions between the Hindus and Muslims widened when Jinnah 
reinvented the Muslim League in Gujarat. This was a consequence of regional politics. In the 
1937 elections in the Bombay Presidency, the Muslim League won 20 out of 30 reserved for 
Muslims in the state assembly. Jinnah offered to form a coalition with the Congress ministry 
that had won 87 seats. But the Congress leader, Sardar Patel, refused this offer, and suggested 
instead that the League should merge with the Congress. Jinnah rejected this offer, and 
tensions arose between the two parties, with this filtering through to the Ahmedabad 
municipality. The members of the League refused to acquiesce in the decisions taken by the 
Congress, whether these decisions pertained to the renaming of bridges across the Sabarmati, 
wearing of hand-spun and hand-woven khadi, or the celebration of Gandhi’s birthday. ’Each 
action and counteraction reinforced bitterness and hostility between leaders of the two 
communities’, note Yagnik and Sheth (2005: 164).  
 
Matters worsened when as a counter to the Congress mass contact movement in the Bombay 
Presidency, Jinnah launched his own mass contact movement in mid 1937. Subsequently he 
established branches of the Muslim League in Gujarat. Soon the Muslims of Gujarat began to 
view the Congress ministry in Bombay, and Congress-controlled local authorities, with 
profound suspicion. In February 1938, the Bombay Presidency Muslim Association met in 
Ahmedabad and passed a number of resolutions expressing complete lack of confidence in the 
Congress ministry. The Muslim community became aggressive, and between 1938 and 1940 
some incidents of communal violence took place in Ahmedabad. In April 1941, some Muslim 
miscreants launched a massive attack on the Hindu localities of the city. After four days of 
furious rioting, 76 lay dead and more than 300 were injured, with the casualties being mainly 
Hindu (Hardiman 2006: 163-4). Inter-communal tensions were summed up in the District 
Magistrate’s report on communal riots in the city (Government of India 1941):  
Since 1937, relations between the two communities have deteriorated rapidly. The 
Mahomeden community felt that they could not get justice in the time of the 
Congress ministry. They considered that they must organize themselves strongly 
to protect their rights .The Muslim League became very powerful in the city and 
practically all Mohammadens of note, except a few Congressmen became 
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members of it. The Muslim League formed a small but united and clamorous 
opposition in the Ahmedabad Municipality, nearly all the other members of which 
were Congressmen. The Municipality instead of confining itself to its proper 
activities, reflected the atmosphere of the time, and in consequence in the last four 
years there have been many ‘scenes’ between the Congress and the League 
members at Municipal meetings. The local Mahomeddans were also getting more 
and more irritated with other Hindu organizations. Of recent months, the Pakistan 
scheme of Mr Jinnah has made a wide breach between the two communities. The 
local Hindu Mahasabha was particularly bitter against the scheme and constantly 
exhorted Hindus to adopt more vigorous actions. 
Nothing illustrated the gap between the two communities more than the Quit India movement 
of 1942 against the colonial government, of which Ahmedabad formed the centre. The 
agitation was remarkable for the strength and duration of protests, and the city was typed as 
the ‘Stalingrad of India’. The core of the support for the movement came from middle-class 
people belonging to the higher castes, and their localities provided the centres for the 
agitation. In the city business came to a halt, because the retail, wholesale and share markets 
were closed in protest against government repression. More effective were the demonstrations 
and the mass protests, processions, the holding of special days of dissent and continual 
harassment of the authorities. Notably absent from these demonstrations were the Muslims, 
who at that time made up twenty percent of the population of the city: evidently they felt little 
sympathy with the movement. In April 1942, the twelve Muslim members of the municipality 
were the only ones who refused to support a motion condemning the arrest of the Congress 
leaders (Hardiman 2006: 163-5).   
 
A shared and widespread participation in political struggles does not appear to be a 
constitutive feature of the anti-colonial struggle in Ahmedabad. Thus, a process that arguably 
had the potential to construct solidarity across identities, and which had the capacity to 
counteract the development of exclusive identity-producing and reproducing schemes, was 
aborted. The 1941 communal riot, the lack of Muslim participation in the 1942 Quit India 
movement and the partition of India in 1947 have left a bitter legacy of suspicion and hate 
between the communities. It is precisely this legacy that is played up by the organisations of 
the extreme religious right. After independence, the Muslim community has participated in 
state and national politics, voted for national parties,  been elected to the state legislature and 
the local bodies. Yet the ‘Hindutva brigade’ refuses to let the past be forgotten. When Muslim 
localities are typed as ‘mini-Pakistan’, or when the road between two residential areas is 
labelled the border, the intention is clearly to evoke memories of the time when the country 
was partitioned amidst furious communal killings. What is effectively sidelined in the process 
of constructing the Muslim community as the ‘other’ is that an overwhelming majority of the 
Muslim community chose to stay in India. This choice should have been honoured and the 
community given all the rights that are constitutionally due to them. But in a post-partition 
India the religious right refuses to let go of the two-nation theory. Consequently, religious 
groups, instead of entering into a dialogue with each other, recognising each other, or 
realising that far more binds them together than divides them, have come to be further 
polarised.  Group identities have hardened as a consequence. The net result is that the second 
essential precondition for a civil society that can battle undemocratic organisations and 
movements has not been set in place.  
 
The Politics of the Work Place 
A third way in which people subscribing to distinct persuasions can be brought together is 
through the politics of the work place. Ahmedabad provided a particularly felicitous 
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environment for such a possible development, because one of the largest textile industries was 
established in the city in the second half of the nineteenth century. Compared to other cities in 
colonial India, the textile industry in Ahmedabad was set up through indigenous endeavours, 
and funded through indigenous capital investments by small investors and later banks. The 
first mill that came up in 1858, the Ahmedabad Spinning and Weaving Company, was 
established by a Nagar Brahmin Ranchodlal Chhotalal who belonged neither to the traditional 
trading class, nor to the artisan turned traders. Members of the intellectual and professional 
Nagar community had worked for the courts, and had not been traditionally involved in 
commerce. As a government official, Ranchodlal was not experienced in business, but he was 
interested in new technology. Drive, entrepreneurship, and perseverance motivated him to lay 
the foundations of an industry that generated financial gains for the city; that provided 
employment to thousands of people form the city and outside; that gave rise to a major 
working class, and an innovative trade union, and that transformed Ahmedabad into a major 
industrial city of India. The mills set up by Ranchodlal proved a financial success, and this 
inspired his friend Bechardas Lashkari to start the second mill in 1867. Increasingly families 
that were well established in trade and commerce began to invest in the industry, financed by 
the traditional money lending castes.  
 
By the late-1800s, Ahmedabad had become the centre of the textile industry in India, with the 
number of mills increasing from 9 in 1891, to 27 in 1900, and 52 by 1910. In 1920, 51 mills 
were employing 43,515 workers (Gillion 1969: 88). By the time the state of Gujarat was 
formed in 1960, Ahmedabad housed 24.9 percent of the working factories and employed 
about 48.2 percent of the labour in the whole state. The textile industry formed the base of the 
city’s economy, and about two-thirds of its industrial production was in the textile and allied 
industries (Mahadevia 2002: 4852).  
 
The textile industry in the latter decades of the nineteenth century provided economic 
incentives and opportunities to all people living in the city, and beyond. Yet the city’s 
different communities had unequal access to these benefits. Whereas some Hindu castes were 
able to take quick advantage of the openings provided in terms of ownership of factories, 
employment in profitable jobs, involvement in the ancillary sector, distribution and finance, 
Muslims – with the exception of the Bohra community – generally lost out. During the period 
of Mughal rule, Muslims had acquired positions in the court as soldiers and as high officials, 
but only a few Muslims had consolidated a trading or business inheritance. Therefore, as the 
Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency reported (1913: 25), the largely illiterate Muslim 
community was simply not in a position to take advantage of proffered opportunities. Gillion 
(1969: 89) writes that the: 
‘Muslims remained humble weavers or gentlemen pensioners living in pride and 
semi-poverty. It has often been noted that their failure to take advantage of the 
opportunities open to them under British rule-for any British discrimination 
against them was less important here than their own lack of initiative-was of great 
significance in the modern history of the sub-continent. They trailed behind the 
Hindus in government service (except the army), in the professions, in commerce, 
and in industry.’  
The establishment of the textile industry could not alter the situation, because like land 
ownership, the structure of employment and profit was deeply embedded in a hierarchical 
caste, and an exclusionary religious, social milieu. Only a very few Muslims owned textile 
mills, while the majority began to work as labourers in the industry 
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Within the industry, allocation of tasks was on the basis of caste and religion. The workers in 
the spinning department were mainly dalits belonging to the lower castes. The weaving 
department consisted, among others, of Muslims, whose traditional occupation had been 
handloom weaving (Bremen 2004: 16). The division of labour on the basis of caste and 
religion was reflected in the organisation of the trade union. In January 1918, mill owners – 
who structured their profits on controlled wages – ruled that since the plague that had struck 
the city in 1917 was over, the plague bonus (70 percent of the wage) that had been offered as 
an incentive to workers to stay on in the city would be withdrawn.  This decision resulted in 
tremendous discontent and resistance. The plight of the workers, who were hit hard by rising 
prices during the First World War, was brought to the attention of Gandhi through a 
prominent mill owner, Sarabhai, and his sister Anusuya, who had initiated a programme of 
social reform among the workers.  Gandhi decided to intervene and requested Sarabhai to 
raise the wages of the workers. In February, the workers went on strike because the owners 
insisted that they would increase wages only by 20 percent and not 50 percent as was the 
demand.  Gandhi appealed to the workers that they should desist from any action that would 
create bitterness between the two parties: the employers and the employees. The workers 
should, suggested Gandhi, demand a moderate wage increase, and if this was resisted, settle 
the issue by arbitration. Gandhi’s recommendation set in place the limits of the future union: 
no violence, no strikes, no bitterness, no enmity, no confrontation, only arbitration and 
negotiation. 
 
The matter was referred to a board of arbitration headed by the Collector of Ahmedabad, and 
Gandhi represented the workers. But this initiative did not succeed and the workers went on 
strike in mill after mill. A group of owners locked out workers who had demanded a wage 
hike, and withdrew from arbitration on the plea that Gandhi had no authority to represent the 
workers. Ultimately the striking workers agreed to Gandhi’s suggestion that they accept a 35 
percent increase. They pledged that they would not resume work unless their demands were 
met, but that they would remain law-abiding during the lock out. Gandhi began to organise 
mass meetings of the workers, and issued leaflets to educate them on the basic principles of 
satyagraha, or righteous struggle through passive resistance (Desai  1983: 39).  At the same 
time he tried to convince the mill owners that a complete victory over the workers would be 
morally counterproductive, because it would demonstrate nothing but the power of money. 
 
The decision of the mill owners to take back workers who had accepted a 20 percent raise in 
wages resulted in the intensification of the strike. In March, Gandhi announced his intention 
of going on a fast until a settlement was reached, or until all the workers left the mills: the 
first time he undertook a fast in order to influence developments in an industrial setting. 
Intimidated by the ensuing publicity, and fearing the outpouring of public anger, the mill 
owners agreed to negotiate, and a solution was reached on 18 March: on the first day they 
returned to work, the workers would get a 35 percent increase; on the second, a 29 percent 
raise; and on the third, 27½ percent. This arrangement would stay until the award was 
announced. In August the arbitrator announced a 35 percent increase.    
 
In Ahmedabad, Gandhi had to come to terms with the same industrial culture that he had 
previously condemned, and he was compelled to chart out his own policy on industrial 
relations. He came to the conclusion that the industry should not be harmed by strikes, that 
capital and labour were interdependent, that the purpose of unions was not to coerce 
employers but protect workers, and that strikes should take place only when all other attempts 
at negotiations had failed. This philosophy continued the ethos of Ahmedabad’s mills – that 
of referring to the workers as part of the family – and it is this philosophy that formed the 
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bedrock of the Textile Labour Association (TLA) set up in 1920. The name of the union – the 
Majoor Mahajan Sangh – embodied the notion of partnership between the workers and the 
Mahajans, or the pre-industrial guilds through which financiers and merchants had conducted 
their business. The trade union adopted the principle of compromise rather than of 
confrontation, and that of arbitration and conciliation rather than of strikes.13 At the same time 
the union continued to focus on social reforms, such as literacy and hygiene. The special 
character of the union was thus grounded in a preference for arbitration and compromise over 
class struggle, and a culture of social work amongst the poor. Under the influence of the 
leaders of the Congress Party – Gandhi, Sardar Patel and Gulzarilal Nanda – the TLA became 
a part of Congress politics. Through the party, the union participated in local self-government 
bodies right up till 1969 when the Congress Party split. At that point the TLA withdrew, and 
constructed its own National Labour Organisation.  
 
The irony is that though workers accepted arbitration instead of confrontation, and partnership 
with capital instead of class consciousness, they failed to internalise the philosophy of 
Gandhi: that of non-violence. The spirit of non-violent struggle simply did not capture the 
imagination of the working class. It also did not seem to capture the spirit of the city that 
Gandhi had made his home for ten years. The recurrent communal riots tell a story of a lesson 
of non-violence half learnt or not learnt at all. Thus in 1919, when reports of Gandhiji’s 
detention by the colonial government swept the city, the result was mob violence, and in 
killings and burning of jails, the telegraph office and the collectors office. But Gandhians 
such as Vallabhai Patel, Indulal Yagnik, Kaka Kalelkar and Ravishankar Maharaj had walked 
the streets to counsel patience and reassure the workers (Spodek 1989: 786). But neither the 
Gandhians nor the trade union leaders intervened in subsequent riots. In the 1969 communal 
riot, workers clashed in the industrial localities, but the TLA did not mediate. In 1981-82 and 
1985-6 waves of riots broke out against the extension of protective discrimination for the 
lower castes to other backward castes. Though the measures would have helped the workers 
who belonged to these castes, the TLA again did not intervene to protect its own members 
(Shah 1970).  Leaders of the TLA neither walked the streets to restore sanity, nor did they 
back their own workers, who belonging to the scheduled castes would have benefited from 
the reservation policy.  
 
If the trade union leadership failed to raise a collective voice of protest against the communal 
killings that marred its city, the union also failed to develop a radical working class culture 
that could enable the workers to access a class identity and thus relate to one another. Though 
the union secured for its members higher salaries, shorter working hours, non-employment of 
children below twelve years of age and bonuses, it did not develop a confrontationist attitude 
to big capital. In 1923, the TLA went on strike because the mill owners had announced a 
wage cut of 20 percent. The strike did not prove a success, and after two months workers 
were compelled to return to work after agreeing to a wage cut of 15 percent. Subsequently 
strikes were more or less abandoned, and it is indicative of the turn that trade union politics 
took over the years that the only other occasion when the union went on strike was in 
response to a call given by the rightist Hindu Defence Society in 1985 during the anti-caste 
turned communal riot. 
 
While charting out a new form of relationship between the workers and the mill owners, the 
union failed to address a singular problem that besets Indian society: that of casteism and 
communalism. Just as the different stages of production were dominated by different castes 
                                                 
13 Workers have never been elected to union leadership, nor have they been present when outsiders according to 
the proposed rules of arbitration met behind closed doors to deliberate on their complaints (Breman 2004: 44). 
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and religious groups, the organisation of the union reiterated these distinctive identities. The 
TLA was an umbrella organisation, which brought together eight separate craft- and 
occupation-based unions within the industry, with workers becoming members of the 
organisation through their own unions. Since their own occupational slot within the textile 
industry was based on caste and religion, it is as members of a specific identity group that 
they joined the TLA. Identities were thus reinforced rather than mediated by their class 
identity as workers.  
 
The net result was the consolidation of caste and religious barriers, which had already been 
erected in neighbourhoods and in political practices. The consequences of segmented 
workplace and neighbourhood politics were serious. Since Muslim workers were largely 
based in departments that had few workers from other groups, these workers set up a separate 
organisation on the ground claiming that the Gandhian union was under the influence of the 
mill owners: ‘They felt more at home here than in the TLA, with its dominant Hindu style’ 
(Breman 2004: 75). Thereafter the union leadership did not extend its support to Muslim 
workers. In 1937, mill owners cut the wages of weavers by 25 percent. The TLA, which was 
associated with the Congress, maintained a silence. The Lal Vavta Mill Kamgar Union 
established by the Communists assumed leadership, and about 50,000 mainly Muslim 
workers went on a strike that lasted for three weeks. The Congress government imposed 
prohibitory orders banning all meetings and processions, and arrested several communist and 
socialist leaders and workers. When the Congress and the mill owners failed in their tasks, 
Gulzarilal Nanda – the Majoor Mahajan leader who was in charge of the labour portfolio of 
the government – brokered a settlement and reduced the wage cut by 7 percent. At that time, 
Dinkar Mehta – one of the leaders of the striking workers and a pioneer of the Gujarat 
Communist Party – wrote in his biography: 
Almost all the workers of the weaving sections participated in this strike and a 
sizeable number among them were Muslim. We realized through experience that 
although Muslim workers had respect and sympathy for Lal Vatva, their political 
consciousness had not broken out of the confines of the Muslim League. This 
ambivalent attitude persisted among Muslim workers for a long time. (Yagnik and 
Sheth 2005: 218)  
After the strike, some of the textile mills discharged a large number of Muslim workers, and 
neither the ministry nor the Majoor Mahajan took steps to reinstate the workers. On the other 
hand, the Muslim League leadership condemned the action of the mill owners and held the 
Congress ministry responsible. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Muslim workers turned 
to the League (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 219). In 1940, the Pakistan resolution demanding a 
separate state was adopted by the Muslim League, which had a big presence in the city where 
it had established a volunteer corps. Members of the Khaksar movement – mainly Muslim 
artisans and the lower middle class – underwent military training in uniform and they 
considered themselves the ‘Army of Islam’. The movement mobilised the Muslim community 
effectively and when Muhammed Ali Jinnah visited Ahmedabad in 1940, a 35,000 strong 
crowd consisting mostly of Muslim assembled to hear him speak. 
 
Clearly the trade union could not bring together the various communities in a shared project 
that defined the interests of the workers. Nor did the structure of this trade union manage to 
transform the social context of hierarchy and exclusion in the city, even at the point when the 
textile industry attracted a major part of the city’s workforce. The TLA, concludes Masihi 
‘remained a conservative union working on Gandhian lines…the whole approach tends to 
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strengthen narrow loyalties of the workers at the cost of solidarity of the working class’ (cited 
in Breman 2004: 133): 
‘Although the Gandhian union pursued a policy of positive discrimination with 
respect to Harijans (children of God) it displayed a certain reticence towards 
Muslims. This was fuelled…by a tendency among Muslims themselves…not to 
join the TLA. As a result, this religious minority was in a vulnerable position, 
which was expressed in a less active representation of their interests.’ (Breman 
2004: 133-4)  
The final pronouncement on the nature and the consequences of the union was made by the 
1929 Royal Commission on Labour, which observed that ‘in Ahmedabad the [textile] 
workers, excluding the Musalman weavers, are organised in a group of craft unions’ 
(Holmstorm 1984: 65).  The third precondition for a democratic civil society, work place and 
union politics, could not be established in Ahmedabad. 
 
The Trigger: The Rise of the Sangh Parivar 
Thus Ahmedabad provides us with a paramount case of a segmented and divided city, as 
manifested in separate housing, fragmented politics and segmented work place and trade 
union activism. The absence of these three background conditions prevented the formation of 
a civil society with the capacity to battle undemocratic organisations and practices. If people 
cannot come together in civil society because they have been divided by processes in other 
spheres of collective existence, then civil society can hardly succeed in keeping watch on the 
state, as well as on undemocratic groups within civil society itself. However, the fact that 
different communities in Ahmedabad have reached out to each other only partially still does 
not explain the periodic bloodletting that has taken place in the city. The translation of 
prejudice, discrimination and hatred into acts of violence that target populations and seek 
destruction of property and livelihoods requires a trigger. In Ahmedabad this trigger was 
provided by the cadres of the religious right. These cadres tapped social and cultural 
prejudices, excavated bigoted sentiments, made people remember historical wrongs, 
enunciated an ideology of Hindu supremacy, crafted a strategy to ensure the domination of 
Hindus, mobilised people, and identified appropriate moments for the inauguration of a riot 
and the infliction of violence.  
 
Arguably people do not kill each other just because they have not connected in the spaces of 
civil society. People do not perform ritual acts of violence on the bodies of another just 
because they perceive the other as unknown and feared. In large parts of India, social groups 
have been able to live with each other amidst a high degree of intolerance and even social 
discrimination, without this intolerance and discrimination breaking out in violence. Violence 
requires agents and purveyors of bloodshed. This agent in Ahmedabad, as in much of Gujarat, 
was the Sangh Parivar. Certainly without a background of segmentation this particular agent 
could not have found a fertile ground to plant its seeds of hate; but without this agent, 
different groups might not have engaged in the politics of extermination quite in the way that 
they have done so. In the late 1960s, Justice Reddy’s report on the 1969 riot foregrounded the 
role of the Sangh Parivar in the violence: 
Another noticeable feature to which we must make a reference is the definite part 
played in various districts which were affected by the workers of the local Jana 
Sangha and Hindu Mahasabha organisations or by persons having leanings 
towards them. (Yagnik and Sheth 2005: 252) 
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The Rashtriya Swami Sevak Sangh (RSS), which is the linchpin of the Sangh Parivar, was 
established in Gujarat in 1941. Ten years later, the party of the Sangh Parivar, the Jan Sangh 
(JS), was also formed.  At that time the cadres of the religious right set about mobilising the 
support of the upper castes for their project: the doctrine of Hindu supremacy. In 1968, the 
Hindu Dharam Raksha Samiti, or the society for the protection of Hinduism, was established 
in the city. This organisation was a catalyst in causing and extending the 1969 riots. However, 
the JS and its later avatar, the Bharitya Janata Party (BJP), did not begin to succeed 
electorally in the state until the 1990s. This is because ever since the banning of the Hindu 
Mahasabha in the 1940s after one of its members had assassinated Gandhi, the Sangh Parivar 
– and especially the RSS – had occupied more or less the margins of Indian politics. Oddly 
enough it was the students’ movement in Bihar and Gujarat in 1974 that brought the RSS and 
the JS onto the centre stage of Indian politics. The Navnirman movement, which was led by 
the socialist leader Jaya Prakash Narain, mobilised a large constituency against the corruption 
of Indira Gandhi’s government, and the rise in the price of essential commodities. The 
movement brought under its fold a number of organisations, including the party’s youth wing, 
the Jan Sangha Vidyarthi Parishad, which actively participated in popular agitations. As part 
of the protest coalition, the JS and the RSS acquired massive legitimacy; and this legitimacy 
was further enhanced when the RSS cadres were arrested during the internal emergency 
imposed by Indira Gandhi. 
 
The legitimacy accorded to the cadres of the Sangh Parivar during the pre-emergency and 
emergency days represented one side of the story. The other side is the political opportunity 
that was provided to these groups to enter the formal arena of politics in Gujarat in the mid-
1980s, which had been dominated by the Congress since the formation of the state. The image 
of the Congress had been badly dented by the imposition of the emergency.  In a bid to 
recover electoral gains, the aspirant Congress Chief Minister, Madhav Singh Solanki, and 
Jhinabhai Darji tried to project the Congress as a pro-poor, pro-backward caste, and a pro-
Muslim party. Towards this end they formulated a strategy termed KHAM. The acronym 
stood for a coalition of the backward castes, or the Kshatriyas, the scheduled castes, or the 
Harijans, the scheduled tribes, or the Adivasis, and the Muslims. Together these groups 
represented almost 56 percent of the population in Gujarat. The formula proved successful, 
and the Congress won a majority of seats in the 1981 assembly election, and all but one of the 
26 seats in the general election. But the strategy sent shivers of apprehension through the 
collective spine of the upper castes, because clearly their monopoly on power was over. 
Expectedly these castes migrated in rapid measure to right-wing groups that followed an 
aggressive line on Hinduism, and who were protective of caste privilege. 
 
Events rapidly overtook this particular turn in state politics. The Congress government tried to 
benefit the constituents of the KHAM coalition by extending quotas in the system of higher 
education and in government jobs to the backward caste, and students from the upper castes 
erupted in angry protests. The Sangh Parivar supported this campaign, and its youth wing – 
the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad – led the agitation against dalits and backward castes. 
The caste war lasted for three months in the city, as well as in the state of Guajarat, and forty 
people lost their lives.  By 1982, the BJP realised that the agitation was harming its potential 
electoral support, and more significantly was preventing the unity of the Hindus across caste 
and tribe. Various organisations, with the most prominent being the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
and the Bajrang Dal, began to work among the dalits and the adivasis, providing relief and in 
general rehabilitating the parivar, which had come to be identified with the upper caste and 
class. By 1983, attempts at forging inter-caste unity had begun to show some results. 
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In January 1985, the Chief Minister Solanki increased the reservation quota for socially and 
economically backward castes and tribes by 18 percent, thereby raising reservations to a total 
of 49 percent. The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad inaugurated a six-month-long war 
against the policy. In Ahmedabad, dalit localities were attacked, and strikes, shut downs, 
school closures and curfews brought the city to a halt. On 19 March, a group of Hindus 
attacked Muslims in the Dariapur area killing three people and injuring eight (Spodek 1989: 
761). Violence spread to the western parts of the city, forty-five people were injured and 
property worth 300,000 million rupees was destroyed. Matters worsened in April, with the 
violence spreading to the industrial areas. In May, the caste violence slid into communal 
violence even though the Muslims had no role to play in this confrontation: they were simply 
not the beneficiaries of the reservation system. But the transformation of a caste into a 
communal riot was the outcome of a deliberately crafted strategy by the BJP. Intent on 
forging an inter-caste alliance between the Hindus, the cadres of the Hindu right, particularly 
the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, focussed on presenting the Muslim as the 
enemy. The tension between castes was thus externalised and projected onto a third party, the 
Muslims. It has even been argued by some scholars that caste conflicts fostered communalism 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Shai 2005: 861). Though these cadres had been opposed to 
reservation policies, in 1985 the BJP reversed its stance and began to favour a reservation 
policy, and work for the abolition of untouchability.  
 
The electoral fortunes of the party rose, improving dramatically in the period following 1987, 
with the party winning seats in the Ahmedabad Municipality Elections, the parliament, and 
the state-assembly elections; and since 1995, the BJP has been in power in Gujarat. A 
religious group had succeeded not only in its state-making project, but also in taking over 
state power. The second and third preconditions of a democratic civil society were thus 
neutralised. Confronted by a state government that was complicit in the violence against the 
minorities; civil society slid further into inactivity.  
Towards a Conclusion: Implications for the Civil Society Argument. 
Let us now draw together the various threads of the argument, and work out the larger 
implications of this case study for the civil society argument. For the foremost question that 
confronts us in this context is: what accounts for the failure of civil society to raise a 
collective voice of protest against immoderate deliberate acts of violence, both by state 
officials and civil society’s own organisations in Ahmedabad?14 I raise this question because 
civil society in democratic societies (and there is formal democracy in the state of Gujarat) is 
expected to keep watch on violations of democratic norms by the state, through citizen 
activism, the making and circulation of informed public opinion, a free media, and a 
multiplicity of social associations. It is only a vibrant and a watchful civil society that can 
prevent the political elite from lapsing in its commitments and responsibilities. In 1790, the 
eminent Irish orator, wit, legal luminary, and Member of the British Parliament, John Curran 
(1750-1817) had suggested that “the condition on which god hath given liberty to man is 
eternal vigilance.” This is the historical mandate of civil society. However, the task of civil 
                                                 
14 The concept of civil society can be employed in a generic sense or in terms of a definite location. Civil society 
in the country responded to the one-sided violence that was employed against the Muslims in Ahmedabad with 
outrage, a number of citizen organisations investigated, documented and circulated abuses of basic fundamental 
rights, and social activists played a significant role in compelling police stations to record or re-open First Hand 
Information Reports, brought culprits to the notice of the judiciary, and mobilised opinion through meetings, the 
media, and the written word.  In this work I refer specifically to civil society in the urban space of Ahmedabad. 
Locating civil society in specific spaces is helpful because boundedness enables us to understand the different 
ways in which agents realise or do not realise the nature of the civil society project. 
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society does not end here. Given the plural nature of the sphere, it is almost certain that some 
organisations within civil society itself will carry within them the seeds of authoritarianism 
and a ‘will to power’. Democratic organisations in civil society, therefore, have to be Janus 
faced, with one face turned towards the state, and the other turned inwards towards its own 
members.  
 
One major implication follows this brief depiction of what civil society in democratic polities 
ought to look like. We cannot assume that all organisations of civil society will always be 
democratic. Undemocratic organisations will have to be engaged with, countered, and even 
neutralised by groups committed to democracy. The realisation of the mandate of civil 
society, accordingly, demands intentional and determined political action, a fair degree of 
toleration here, some amount of intolerance there, a readiness to engage with others; and an 
extraordinary amount of political courage and will to battle both undemocratic states, and 
undemocratic groups within the sphere. In sum, although we cannot assume that civil society 
will always be democratic, we presume that organisations are ready to do battle with 
undemocratic agents. But in the city of Ahmedabad, despite the fact that within a system of 
formal democracy a number of organisations have taken root in the space of civil society, it 
almost seems as if these organisations have abdicated their responsibility to battle 
undemocratic groups in civil society, as well as keep watch on lapses of democracy by the 
state. 
 
It is in this precise context that we can now proceed to raise a question that has not until now 
been placed on the agenda of the civil society argument. Though a vigilant and vibrant civil 
society is considered to be one of the essential preconditions of democracy, it is, perhaps time 
to ask what the preconditions of civil society are.  The major precondition, it seems to me, is 
that people, who may well subscribe to different persuasions, occupy different niches in the 
economy and in society, and who may well be unknown to each other, can ‘come together’ in 
a series of distinctive and overlapping projects in the space of civil society. This is not to say 
that people do not ‘come together’ in a competitive electoral and an equally competitive 
market system. The logic of civil society, or so it is expected, runs in a direction that is 
qualitatively different to that of the market and the state. Compared to the power driven state 
and the profit driven market, the ethos that imbues civil society is that of sociability and 
solidarity. These properties of social relations are a necessary outcome of participation in 
shared projects: safeguarding the fundamental rights of citizens, keeping a watch on the state, 
protecting people against the exploitative market system, or simply encouraging discussion 
and debate among participants. This, in effect, implies that unless people come together 
across religious, caste, and other ethnic divides, civil society can hardly keep watch on all 
manners of transgressions by all sorts of agents. Conversely, if civil society is not constituted 
as a space of sociability and solidarity by associational life, then organisations can prove to be 
fairly indifferent to the plight of some of their own members.  
 
However, if the practices of the economy, of the polity, and of society reiterate, re-enact, and 
reify cultural divides in a plural society, how much can civil society organisations contribute 
to the ironing out of these divisive tendencies? Civil society organisations can build on and 
consolidate pre-existing webs of solidarity and sociability, but they cannot create these 
sentiments if they have been systematically destroyed or subverted by other practices. It 
follows that the ability of people to come together in the shared spaces of civil society itself 
demands three prerequisites.  
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The first prerequisite for a viable civil society requires that, in plural and divided societies, the 
offshoots of identity producing and reproducing and identity confronting systems should be 
largely or even partially offset, neutralised, or mediated through various transactions in the 
work place, through shared engagement in political struggle, and through social interaction in 
shared neighbourhoods. To reiterate a point that has by now become commonplace; persons 
are located in a multiplicity of identities. Their primary identity is produced by their cultures, 
language, religion, or what in generic terms is called ethnicity. This identity is primary 
because it is the identity we are born into. But being born into an identity by no means implies 
that this identity cannot be mediated by the politics of the work places, struggles, movements, 
and neighbourhoods. People are not likely to be locked into one identity, howsoever primary 
it may be, if they have other identities to draw upon. They do not have to put aside their 
primary identities or abandon them.  All that is required is a willingness to consider, engage, 
and adopt other forms of identity producing projects, that of the citizen, that of the worker, 
that of the neighbour, and that of the political activist. But if people do not transact with other 
people on the basis of shared identities, then not only is the prospect of dialogue in civil 
society neutralised, the very possibility that civil society can realise its own project is also 
neutralised. 
 
The second prerequisite is that violence is strictly controlled and monitored by the state or 
that the state has a monopoly over coercion. A democratically elected state should have 
acquired control over the means of violence, and it should scrupulously regulate the 
employment of violence by its own auxiliaries according to the rule of law. The employment 
of violence, in other words, needs to be justified. Max Weber had famously argued that in 
modern societies the state acquires a monopoly over violence. ‘Today”, wrote Weber, “the 
use of force is regarded as legitimate only in so far as it is either permitted by the state or 
prescribed by it. Thus the right of a father to discipline his children is recognized as a survival 
of the former independent authority of the head of a household, which in the right to use force 
has sometimes extended to a power of life and death over children and slaves. The claim of 
the modern state to monopolise the use of force is as essential to it as its character of 
compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation.”15 The modern state replaces violence 
by order and authority. Thereby, the sovereign nation state, which is firmly in control of the 
production and reproduction of violence, provides the foundation of the international state 
system. If we were to take this argument to its logical conclusion, at the very time the state 
comes to gather together and monopolise violence, civil society is constituted as a civil or a 
non-violent domain. In other words, since the state is in a position to monopolise and monitor 
all means of violence; in civil society collective practices can be produced and reproduced in 
non-violent ways. 
 
Therefore, when members of civil society enter the sphere they put aside their swords, six 
shooters, and other paraphernalia of violence that may have governed social transactions in 
pre-modern times. Any swordplay or duelling, howsoever dramatically appealing and 
romantically swashbuckling it may appear to us, is not for this sphere. The only weapons that 
can be deployed in the discursive spaces of civil society are those of rhetoric, perorations, 
declamation, and reasoned argument. Or the members of civil society engage in collective 
action, such as marches, demonstrations, protests, demonstrations, strikes, and other means of 
civil disobedience. Violence, however, is simply not allowed. Even if a surplus of violence 
spills over from the control of the state into social practices, civil society in and through the 
politics of engagement should possess the capacity to deal with this phenomenon through 
                                                 
15 Max Weber, 1998, Economy and Society, vol 1, Berkeley, University of California Press, p 56 
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discursive practices. For instance, John Keane (1998, 156) argues that though violence is not 
completely left behind when societies transit from incivility to civility or from pre-modernity 
to modernity, it is possible to counter such violence by the development of a culture of 
civility. “I want to emphasize that the cultivation of public spheres of controversy, in which 
the violent exercise of power is resisted initially by civilian-citizens’ efforts to monitor it non-
violently, is a basic condition for reducing or eliminating incivility…The public spheres of 
civil society can help to cultivate shared memories of times past when terrible things were 
done to people.”  
 
The third prerequisite is that in ethnically divided societies, one identity such as religion or 
language or origin should not become a political project for an ethnic group, which 
consequently aspires to stamp the body politic with this primary and exclusive identity. If this 
happens, discrimination against people that do not belong to the right ethnic group becomes a 
matter of state policy. Simply put, ethnic identities should not become a constitutive aspect of 
a state making project. It is only then that these identities can be mediated, even moderated 
by other identities that we hold, and by various kinds of transactions that bring different sorts 
of identity holders, together. And it is only then that the state does not turn against a section 
of citizens that do not belong to the ‘right’ ethnic group. 
 
Let me now sum up the broad pattern of the argument. It has been suggested in this paper that 
civil society as an essential precondition of democracy is valuable because the sorts of 
transactions people enter into here nourish sociability and breed solidarity. It is only then that 
civil society can proceed to keep watch on, as well as battle, undemocratic practices of the 
state and of other organisations. But the realisation of the project of civil society itself 
demands that people should be able to come together in spheres outside the metaphorical 
boundaries of civil society. Three of these crucial spheres are residential neighbourhoods, 
political struggles, and work place politics. This paper has suggested that in the case of 
Ahmedabad the preconditions for a democratic and vibrant civil society have been weakly 
articulated and inadequately institutionalised. Therefore, when the religious right arose and 
provided the trigger for the translation from non-associationalism to violence, civil society 
was rendered helpless. 
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Annex 1  
 
 
Year Causes Time Scale Casualties and Damages Areas Affected 
State 
(In)Capacity 
1941 Aftermath of the Pakistan Resolution 
18 April to 
16 May 
93 killed, 316 injure, 
shops and houses 
looted, arson, vehicles 
set on fire, 1374 
arrested-589 Hindus 
and 785 Muslims 
Manik Chowk, 
Astodia, Panch 
Kuwas, Pankor 
Naka, Fawara, 
Khadia Charasta, 
Gol Linbda, 
Richey Road, 
Dhansutar’s Pol, 
Hope Market, 
Mandwis 
Pol,kalupur, 
Jamalpur, Raipur, 
Gomtipur, 
Saraspur, Shahpur, 
Dariyapur 
Riots controlled 
by the 
government in a 
month 
1969 
1) Alleged 
desecration of 
Hindu and Muslim 
holy books. 
2) Fall out of the 
split of the 
Congress Party  
21 September 
to 28 
September 
660 people killed, 
arson and stoning, 34 
incidents of stabbing 
and murder on one 
day, 6742 houses 
damaged, 512 persons 
arrested of which 413 
were Muslims. 
Industrial areas worst 
hit, loss of $40 million 
for the Textile 
industry.   
Nadiad, Khulka, 
Khadia, 
Nagodiwad, 
Dariyapur, 
Jamalpur, Kalupur, 
Gondal, 
Chamanpura, 
Aswara, Gomtipur, 
Amraiwari.  
Army had to be 
called in. The 
Jagmohan 
Reddy Judicial 
Commission 
was established 
to inquire into 
the riots .It held 
the RSS and 
other cadres of 
the sangh 
parivar 
responsible. 
1985 
Caste-based 
violence on the 
issue of reservation 
for the scheduled 
and backward 
castes was 
transformed into a 
communal riot 
between Hindus 
and Muslims. 
March-
August 
Police 
recorded 743 
communal 
agitations 
from 
February to 
July. 
220 persons killed, 
100 Muslims 
murdered and 400 
were stabbed, 1200 
Muslims rendered 
homeless. 
Loss of property 
amounted to $1,75 
billion. 
2500 homes of 
Muslims were 
damaged and 1500 
shops were burnt  
 
Dariyapur, 
Kalupur, and 
Bapunagar 
Police involved 
in attacks on the 
minority 
community. 
Professional 
criminals were 
involved. Army 
was called in. 
The Dave 
Commission 
was established 
to go into the 
causes of the 
riot 
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1990 
Advani began his 
chariot procession 
to mobilise people 
for building the 
Ram temple where 
the Babri Masjid 
stood. The 
procession took off 
from the Somnath 
temple. Whenever 
the procession 
passed through 
Muslim dominated 
areas the Hindu 
supporters shouted 
obscene and 
provocative 
slogans. 
Advani was 
arrested by the 
Bihar state 
government in 
Samastipur. 
Passions were 
inflamed by the 
strikes and the 
closures called for 
by the VHP and the 
BJP. This led to 
attacks on Muslims 
in Ahmedabad. 
April 
60 persons killed, 
extensive loss and 
damage of property 
belonging mainly to 
Muslims  
Jamnagar, 
Kangdapeeth, 
Nawawadah, 
Sarangpur, Chakla, 
Kalupur, 
Dariyapur, 
Gomtipur, 
Juhapura, 
Shahipur, 
Khanpur, Paldi, 
Satellite Road, 
Astodia, 
Maninagar 
State failure to 
control the riot 
1993 
Aftermath of the 
demolition of the 
Babri mosque on 6 
December 1992 
January and 
December 
292 persons were 
killed, and massive 
loss of property 
occurred 
Daryapur, 
Wadigram, 
Naginapol, 
Charval, Dholka, 
Khambher, 
Ankleshwar, 
Nabipur, Patan, 
Shahpur, Kalupur, 
Bapunagar, 
Kakadbita 
 
State failure to 
control the riot 
1999 
Incident of kite 
flying, animal 
slaughter, the 
annual Jaganath 
temple procession 
and the fall out of 
the Kargil conflict 
between India and 
Pakistan 
January, 
March, July 
19 people killed, 99 
injured, 92 incidents 
of stabbing, 35 
arrested. Loss of 
property, 20 vehicles 
set on fire, 25 
buildings set on fire. 
Kalupur, 
Dariyapur, 
Shahpur, 
Gomtipur, 
Bapunagar, 
Karang, Saraspur, 
Khadiya, Panch 
Paldi, Relief Road, 
Gandhi Road  
 
State Failure to 
control riots 
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2000 
A Bajrang Dal and 
VHP mob of about 
40-50 people 
attacked a newly 
constructed 
building owned by 
a Muslim, and 
shouted 
provocative 
slogans. 
Tension occurred 
during elections 
February, 
May, July, 
August, 
September, 
December 
Unaccounted dead, 
property worth Rs 
200,000 destroyed. A 
Muslim shrine 
opposite the Amdapur 
police station was 
destroyed, and a 
hundred people were 
arrested.  
Madhepura, 
Dudheshwar, 
Kalupur, 
Dariyapur, 
Jamalpur, Shahpur 
State failure to 
control riots 
2002 
Train compartment 
set on fire one km 
from Godhra 
station. 
In retaliation Hindu 
mobs began to 
attack Muslim 
neighbourhoods 
 
 
27 February 
 
28 February 
to 5 March 
 
15 March 
 
26 April to 5 
May 
58 Hindus killed 
 
 
 
700 Muslims killed, 
and hundreds rendered 
homeless 
Godhra 
 
 
 
Entire city 
State complicity 
in the violence 
Police officers 
and political 
leaders 
involved. 
K.G Shah 
Commission and 
later Nanavati 
Commission set 
up. 
Various citizen 
groups and civil 
liberty groups 
investigated the 
violence  
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